“We’re not selling jeans here.” By far, the most memorable quote uttered by Billy Beane, the Oakland Athletics’’ General Manager and the main subject of Michael Lewis’ book Moneyball. Beane’s quote is directed at his scouts as he is explaining why he is intent on drafting players that seem too short, too slow, too fat, or too chubby. As the bewildered scouts complained, Beane basically overlooked all of their work and instead went into the 2002 draft relying mainly on the statistics that college players had compiled. In short, the scouts were essentially useless as all of their work over the past season was disregarded in the final decision making process.
By providing Michael Lewis with behind-the-scenes access to the time leading up to the baseball draft, the Oakland A’s finally made the baseball draft accessible in the same way that the NBA and NFL drafts have been for years. To the diehard baseball fans, this was a breath of fresh air as we can finally see that players are not just chosen by throwing darts at a wall or other random ways. However, the A’s approach is so different from the most of the other teams (Toronto seems to be following Oakland’s method) that there is still a great deal hidden from the public. Any access to the hidden secrets of baseball is great access to a junkie like me.
While a large portion of the book follows the life of Billy Beane, the narrative really picks up steam when it shifts its focus onto players such as Scott Hatteberg and Chad Bradford. It may just be a matter of personal preference, but the in depth looks into the lives of players with whom I already am partly familiar really interest me. That is not to say that I know nothing of Billy Beane, but I cannot watch him perform his job. While watching Scott Hatteberg struggle defensively (especially in the Metrodome!), the book has already given me window into the hard work he began in the winter of 2001 in an attempt to become a passable defensive first baseman.
The anecdotes that are scattered throughout the book are absorbing in their insights and humor while also showing the emotions that run rampant throughout the course of a season. For example, we learn about Billy Beane’s maneuverings at the trade deadline to acquire Ricardo Rincon and Ray Durham while also attempting to maintain the payroll limitations imposed by his owner. This is one of the passages that have drawn national attention as the general managers of opposing teams are made to look unintelligent or as pawns in his greater scheme. Then, after acquiring Rincon, there is a very interesting anecdote about Beane’s discussion with the shaken and confused pitcher as to his role with his new team.
The book is not entirely dedicated to looking at the different players and personalities that helped contribute to the very successful season for Oakland. Instead, there are significant passages about the statistics that have helped the Athletics gain a competitive advantage. The main statistic is on base percentage (hits + walks + times hit by a pitch / plate appearances). Walks are not pretty, not particularly entertaining, and slow the pace of the game. However, they are very helpful in winning games. The logic is simple, but easily overlooked: if you never make an out, then you will score an infinite amount of runs and never lose. While every team would love to have a player who hit a homerun every game, the simple truth is that this type of player does not exist. However, plate discipline can be used to help contribute to a winning team.
On he pitching side, the book delves into the recent theory of Defense Independent Pitching Statistics (DIPS) developed by Voros McCracken (NekcarCcM Sorov spelled backwards). Basically, the theory states that any ball put into play is out of the pitcher’s control. In short, the pitcher could control very few outcomes of a plate appearance: a homerun, a strikeout, a walk or a hit batter. All other results are dependent upon his defense and luck. This idea, that the majority of plate appearances are impacted by luck has been criticized by many and accepted by others. Only time will tell if this theory holds water, but by adopting it as a near truth, the Oakland Athletics were able to acquire some undervalued players.
My one main criticism of the book lies in the way the success of the team was portrayed as entirely related to the belief in these statistics by front office. There was very little mention of the main reason for the success of Oakland – The Big Three. The Big Three – Tim Hudson, Mark Mulder, and Barry Zito – are the young, talented and occasionally dominant starting pitchers that the team developed beginning in 1999. No team in baseball has three better starting pitchers. While the front office surely deserves credit for developing these three pitchers and keeping them healthy, the fact that all three pitchers developed into aces really is more due to luck than anything that Oakland did right. Why were these players such minor characters in the book? Well, I think that Michael Lewis attempted to make the Oakland success appear to be such a response to the techniques and beliefs held by the front office, that it was convenient to ignore the remarkable (and remarkably lucky) development of The Big Three.
Other than that and a couple of other minor quibbles, this book was absolutely fantastic. When it arrived back in May, I picked it up and began reading it that evening. When I looked up, I had finished the book and it was 2:30 AM. The book was so incredibly good, and so engrossing that time literally flew by as I finished it without closing it once. Anyone with an even passing interest in baseball who is curious about how a team is compiled and run should read this book immediately. Also, Moneyball gives the reader a much greater appreciation of the human qualities that many of the people mentioned possessed which makes it easier to cheer for them and follow their career. By giving the reader a window into the life of a general manager, Michael Lewis provided a glimpse of the dream job of millions of readers such as me.